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Abstract
Our aim is to create a simulation based on the rules of the Beer Game which includes the
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that we proposed and the simulation results.
Keywords: Beer Game, Virtual Enterprises, Bullwhip Effect, Transaction Costs, Supply
Chain Management
Permanent URL: http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-13
Copyright: Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works License
Reference: D'Atri A., Spagnoletti P., Banzato A., Bonelli C., D'Atri E., Traversi V., Zenobi
P. (2009). "Supply Chain and Virtual Enterprises: the Beer Game evolution," Proceedings >
Proceedings of ALPIS
itAIS, Italy . Sprouts: Working Papers on Information Systems, 9(13).
http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-13

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-13

1. INTRODUCTION
The Beer Game was developed in the 1960s by the MIT
Sloan System Dynamics Group (Sterman, 1984) as a didactic
tool to simulate information and material flows along the
supply chain from the factory to the retailer. The main goal of
this business game is to show the existence and the
characteristics of the “Bullwhip effect” (Lee et al. 1997). The
Beer Game has four players: retailer, wholesaler, distributor
and factory. These players are distributed along a single
supply chain, communicating with each other only about the
beer orders that each player sends to the nearest one. The
only exception refers to the retailer’s order, represented by
the requests of the final customer, which are established in
advance and are not known by other participants.
Many critics raise questions about the limitations in the
original Beer Game (for convenience, we will refer to as MIT
Beer Game) and suggest some alternatives. Kaminsky and
Simchi-Levi (1998) highlight the limits of the Beer Game in
providing a better way to manage the supply chain. These
critics also highlight that the game structure does not provide
a realistic view of the behaviors involved in the supply chain.
Indeed a linear chain does not allow any choice about the
suppliers. Kimbrough et al. (2002) describe the players
behavior when they join the supply chain. In their view,
players are not motivated to share information; their choices
are taken in situations of bounded rationality and their
individual rational behavior sometimes goes against the
group’s interests. These and other critics (Chen and
Samroengraja 2000) suggest a number of digital versions of
the MIT Beer Game in order to take into account the
variables involved.
Other studies (Ming 2001, Anderson 1994, Beamon 1998)
show how the supply chain evolves into network solutions
based on collaborative and communicative interactions
between two or more enterprises and oriented towards the
coordination of different activities. In such contexts,
transaction costs are a key issue to be taken into account
(Williamson 1981, Lajili and Mahoney 2006). Within this
framework, other critics propose formal representations of
issues such as transaction costs and risks in virtual enterprises
(D'Atri and Motro, 2007). Consequently, studying players’
policies and behaviors involved in the supply chain is
extremely interesting when either the choice of the suppliers
or transaction risk management issues are introduced.
This study has been carried out in the context of the MA in
"collaborative management of the supply chain" held at the
Luiss University in Rome. The MA has a special focus on
interoperability issues and critical relationships among
companies in many productive sectors. We tested the
standard version of the MIT Beer Game and our results were
in line with previous findings. We also designed three
alternative versions of this simulation game in order to
highlight the specific features of modern supply chains such
as the network enterprise structure and the possibility of
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transaction failures. We tried to understand the policies
underlying the behavior of players involved in a supply chain
through simulations. These simulations also led us to obtain a
proof of concept of the new versions of the Beer Game that
are now available for further investigations about the
dynamics of cooperation among the supply chain
participants.
In the next sections we first describe the main characteristics
of each version of the Beer Game in terms of rules, objectives
and simulation results. Then we perform a comparative
analysis of the findings through a discussion focused on costs
and policies. Finally, we summarise the results by providing
some observations about the limitation of this approach and
possible further developments.

2. BEER GAME 1.0
2.1 Description
On the basis of the studies on virtual enterprises, transaction
costs and risk management, we defined three versions of the
MIT Beer Game in order to analyze the policies which affect
the supply chain actors behavior. The first version (also
referred to as Beer Game 1.0) is very similar to the original
version in terms of chain structure. It differs only in the shape
of the market requests since we applied random orders
ranging in a 0-10 set of values corresponding to 44 cards
taken from a deck.
The game has four players with the following roles: retailer,
wholesaler, distributor, and factory. All of them are on the
same linear chain.
The retailer receives a beer order from the final consumer
(card deck) hiding it from the other players; then, according
to his/her policy, the retailer forwards an order to the
wholesaler. The wholesaler sends the order to the distributor
and when the order reaches the factory, the last player
decides how many beers to produce. Each step has a 2 week
lead time for both goods and information. The quality of each
single policy undertaken by the players is assessed on the
basis of stock cost values.
In order to support data collection and analysis, each player
uses an electronic spreadsheet, which includes data related to
sent and received orders, and goods.
2.2 Simulation
In this simulation the Bullwhip effect is not as clear as in the
original simulation because, at the beginning of the game,
players try to increase their inventories and thus the related
costs. In this case, backlog events are briefer than the original
simulation, which is the most important element of the
Bullwhip effect. This is mainly due to the demand faced by

the players, which is different from the one of the MIT beer
game; this has a stable value at the beginning of the game,
then it has an instant positive change that leads to a new
constant higher value for the rest of the game. This step
increase inevitably leads players to backlogs.
In Beer Game 1.0 we explored the case of the stochastic
demand where demand was randomly generated from a
known distribution, e.g., uniformly distributed between a set
of values ranging from 0 to 10. At first, players increased
stock levels to avoid backlog events. Then, they tried to
estimate the variation range production chain. The cost
analysis of the first simulation shows very similar levels to
the MIT Beer Game costs (higher in players farthest from the
final market).
The only significant differences noted were in the costs of the
final retailer (higher in comparison to the two middlemen, i.e.
equal to 5.508). This can be explained as follows: using a
Never Backlog strategy and knowing the variation of the
final demand and the decrease of the goods required by the
market, the distributor’s initial strategy aims at increasing the
warehouse levels during the first weeks and then have a
constant request equal to the average expected level (equal to
5); in the original game, goods required by the market had a
constant value equal to 8, while, in the simulation, the
average value was approximately 4,75. Despite taking into
account the producer’s total costs (reaching the value of
11.952), the lack of the Bullwhip Effect caused many
difficulties to sell off warehouse stock. As to the middlemen,
the wholesaler provides interesting insights: he adopted the
Just in Time model but, due to the delay of orders and
delivery of goods (leading to a 4-week postponement), he
was not able to avoid an oversized warehouse or backlog
events. However, he managed to have the lowest cost (equal
to 2.376).

Firstly, players are not in the same linear chain. Starting from
the retailer, a new diagram is created and the two middlemen
are placed on parallel lines. Secondly, the retailer can chose
to send the order to both the wholesalers or only to one of
them. Finally, the factory manager, on the basis of his own
policy and on stock levels, can choose how many orders to
deal with.

Beer Game 2.0 Supply Chain
In this simulation we used another spreadsheet and, unlike
the previous version (1.0), it is customized to each player.
Firstly, the orders placed by the two wholesalers are
separated and distinguished. Secondly, the factory manager
can choose which order to deal with on the basis of his/her
policy. Thirdly, the retailer dashboard is used to register the
beers received by the two different wholesalers, their
incoming orders, and orders placed.
3.2 Simulation

Beer Game 1.0 Player's Cost

Beer Game 2.0: Player's Cost
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3. BEER GAME 2.0
3.1 Description
In this version of the game, Beer Game 2.0, we introduced
some differences in comparison to the previous version.
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The second simulation provided interesting results. The
players’ total costs are similar to the levels achieved in
simulation Beer Game 1.0 (the factory is the player with the
highest cost, followed by the retailer that adopted the same
strategy, and finally the two wholesalers). Both the

wholesalers’ total costs are equal to the retailer’s cost during
this simulation (after 44 weeks, the retailer scored 14.712 and
both wholesalers scored 14.574).
The Factory generally has the highest costs (17.490) because
it is the player farthest from the market and from the
information relating to the demand. The sum of the two
wholesalers’ costs are very similar to the retailer’s cost. From
this perspective, the retailer has high costs due to the
implementation of a Full Warehouse strategy, which is not
the most suitable strategy in a market with such a low
variability.
4. BEER GAME 2.1
4.1 Description
In comparison to the previous version, Beer Game 2.1 takes
risk management into account. The two wholesalers might
not be able to receive the goods sent by the factory. In that
case, they can transfer the beers available in stock and try to
fulfil the new orders. The other players do not know how
many times this could happen. This variable is
predetermined: the high risk wholesaler has high block
probability (P=0.5) and low backlog costs (Cr= C·(1-P)); the
low risk wholesaler has a lower risk (P=0.16) and higher
backlog costs. In particular:
- The high risk wholesaler pays 3 euros for each beer crate in
the warehouse and 6 euros for each backlog order.
- The low risk wholesaler pays 5 euros for each beer crate in
the warehouse and 10 euros for each backlog order.
The retailer does not know which of the wholesalers poses
the greatest risk, but they can try to implement policies to
find this out (for example, by estimating failed orders).
4.2

Player's

5. DISCUSSION
The results of the three simulations can be analysed from two
different perspectives: (i) the policies implemented by each
player and (ii) warehouse and backlog costs. From a
methodological point of view, each player is asked to review
data collected on their behavior and to describe the strategy
adopted. As to the cost analysis, data collected on each
dashboard were compared.
5.1

Policies

The policies implemented by the players can be summed up
as follows:
BEER GAME 1.0
Factory: On the basis of the first orders, the factory tries to
create a warehouse able to meet the market demand, avoid
backlogs and, afterwards, to set up a strategy aimed at
reducing stock levels.
Wholesaler no. 1: Wholesaler no. 1 firstly implements the
“never backlog” strategy aiming at having stock levels able
to successfully meet the estimated maximum market demand
(10); then, once the wholesaler has reached stock levels equal
to 10, they send orders to wholesaler no. 2 which are equal to
the orders received by the distributor (pass over strategy).
Wholesaler no. 2: Wholesaler no. 2 uses a balanced strategy
in order to have a low-cost warehouse and, at the same time,
to meet the market demand and avoid backlogs.

Simulation

35000

well as in other simulations. The two wholesalers adopted
different strategies; the low-risk wholesaler adopted the lowcost strategy, allowing him to successfully meet the changes
in demand, while the high-risk player, much inclined to take
risks, adopted the Pass Order strategy to reduce the
inventory's cost. Nevertheless, the wholesalers’ costs were
lower in comparison to the Retailer. The total of their cost
(i.e. 10.348) is less than the cost of the Retailer (i.e. 11.430)
because the wholesaler maintained a Low Cost policy.

Cost

Retailer: On the basis of the first orders, the retailer tries to
create a warehouse able to meet the market demand and,
afterwards, to set up a strategy aimed at reducing stock
levels.

30000
25000
Cost
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15000

BEER GAME 2.0

10000

Factory: by adopting a strategy with a cautious attitude to
risk, the factory aims to have unsold stock levels capable of
satisfying demand from the two middlemen, without running
the risk of building up a backlog.
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Analysing the total costs of simulation Beer Game 2.1, we
observed that the Factory has the highest costs (28,752), as
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Wholesaler no. 1: By adopting a balanced strategy,
wholesaler no. 1 aims to keep stocks not particularly high but
always capable of serving orders, minimize costs and avoid
backlogs.

Wholesaler no. 2: By adopting a strategy with a cautious
attitude to risk, wholesaler no. 2 aims to have enough stock
levels to avoid building up a backlog and deal with new
orders.
Retailer: By adopting a strategy with a cautious attitude to
risk, the retailer firstly aims to have a warehouse able to meet
the market demand without running the risk of building up a
backlog; then, he tries to slowly reduce unsold stock.
BEER GAME 2.1
Factory: At first, the factory aims at creating a warehouse
able to meet the demand of the two middlemen, both of
whom are risk subjects. Then, the factory assesses the most
suitable strategies to reduce unsold stock.
High risk wholesaler: At first, the high risk wholesaler aims
at keeping the warehouse at initial levels and then, on the
basis of orders received, aims at reducing stock levels and
Beer Game 1.0

Beer Game 2.0

Beer Game 2.1

Factory

11952

17490

28752

Both
wholesalers

6384

14574

10348

Retailer

5508

14712

11430

their warehouse or reduce costs and showing higher or lower
willingness to take risks.

Beer Game 1.0

Beer Game 2.0

Beer Game 2.1

Factory

Never backlog

Never backlog

Full warehouse

Wholesaler no. 1

Pass order

Low Cost

Low cost

Wholesaler no. 2

Full warehouse

Never backlog

Pass order

Retailer

Full warehouse

Full warehouse

Never backlog

5.2

Costs

During the three Beer Game simulations, we observed that
the costs of each player reflected the results of the MIT Beer
Game simulation; the player farthest from the market always
has higher costs. With the exception of the Retailer costs
(which are always higher in comparison to the Wholesalers in
the three simulations), the Factory has higher costs due to the
total absorption of market demand by the players. This
resulted in no supply demand by the wholesalers and the
factory being unable to clear unsold stock.

meeting orders received.
Low risk wholesaler: Aware of playing the role of the “low
risk” middlemen, their main aim is keeping the lowest unsold
stock levels.

In the Pass Order policy, the player shows a greater
willingness to take risks, as demonstrated by the intention of
keeping low stock levels to reduce costs. Delays in goods
delivery are common to all players; they have a negative
impact on their choice and often lead players to backlog
events. Simulations highlight how players were led to make
choices on the basis of these two main policies, trying to fill

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-13

HIGH
LOW

We used this policy matrix to compare the policies
(Davenport and Harris, 2005) adopted by players and their
willingness to take risks related to two variables: unsold
stock and placed orders. The three simulations that we carried
out highlight two main policies in the warehouse
management: “Never Backlog” and “Pass Order”. In the first
policy, players try to foresee the customer demand and to be
always able to satisfy that request. A negative demand
variation (near to zero) leads to high stock levels and higher
costs that they are not able to reduce.

HIGH

PLACED ORDERS

Retailer: The retailer places substantial orders to both
wholesalers aiming at creating a warehouse able to face
demand variations and, later on during the game, at
identifying the riskiest wholesaler in order to reduce stock
levels and costs.

UNSOLD STOCK
LOW

NEVER BACKLOG

FULL WAREHOUSE

Condition: variable
demand.
Target: executing
orders.
Risk: collapse or
decrease in demand
generates high storage
costs.
LOW COST

Condition: Predicting an
increase in demand
Target: increasing stock
levels to avoid backlogs.
Risk: oversized
warehouse

Condition: the
warehouse is able to
respond to positive
changes in demand.
Target: Stable
inventories with
predictable costs.
Risk: balanced

Condition: constant
demand.
Target: low warehouse
costs.
Risk: risk of backlogs due
to a variable demand
increase and to delays in
good delivery.

PASS ORDER

A comparison between the cost trend in the three simulations
is extremely interesting. A significant cost increase can be
observed between Beer Game 1.0 and Beer Game 2.0, due to
an insufficient market demand towards the supply chain (this
also led to no players demand and stagnation of goods in
most warehouses). During simulation Beer Game 2.1, the two
wholesalers were given different costs on the basis of their
attitude towards risk. For this reason they had lower costs in

comparison to the Retailer cost and made their supply chain
more cost-efficient.
6. CONCLUSIONS
After defining the original supply chain of Sterman’s Beer
Game, we created, tested and analyzed three variants. Then
we collected data and interviewed the different players. At
the end, we managed to analyze and outline the different
strategies and costs involved. We obtained two main results:
(i) we analyzed the relationship between strategies and
structures of the supply chains and (ii) we endeavoured to
provide a new didactic tool to show students the different
implications of a supply chain which takes into account
transaction costs and risks.
With reference to the first aim, we noticed that players
followed four strategies during the three simulations: neverbacklog, full warehouse, low cost and pass order.
From a didactic point of view, these results are extremely
interesting, highlighting the possibility of defining specific
strategies within the distribution chain.
The MIT Beer Game and our versions experienced similar
limitations: firstly, the difficulty of providing a realistic
vision of the supply chain management. Secondly: it is true
that the game structure (where middlemen are placed on
parallel lines) allows the retailer to choose suppliers but
despite this, it cannot be compared to the actual complexities
of a supply chain. Thirdly, we cannot forget that information
exchange can be very slow and this represents a big
limitation for players in the selection and implementation of
strategies. Finally, simulations were carried out by the
students of the MA course in “Collaborative management of
the supply chain” held at the Luiss University and our data
may have been influenced by the previous experience. On the
basis of the latter limitation, we might develop new
approaches to improve the game itself. It would be interesting
(i) to involve students with no previous experience with the
game; (ii) to simulate a supply chain where information is
suddenly available for each player, and not have a slow
information exchange as it happens with goods delays. In
which case, the player would easily opt for a low cost policy,
being able to rely on a strongly integrated supply chain.
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